I raised some hackles over at The Jawa Report this morning when I posted a story about the Iraqi Army and police adopting AR-style rifles in place of the durable and reliable Kalashnikovs they're more familiar with.

As noted in my post, I believe this is a serious mistake owing to the chronic reliability issues that have plagued the AR-style rifles since their introduction.

This isn't to say, of course, that AR's are some kinds of pieces of junk. Far from it. I'm far from some kind of an "AR hater" (see, e.g., the banner graphic for this blog). I own a DPMS Panther that is most definitely a very high-quality, world-class weapon. It is great for the environment in which I operate. It spends the vast majority of its life in a rifle case in my humidity and temperature-controlled house. When I want to use it, I take it to the gun range in its protective case. Despite the fact that the gun range is a relatively clean environment, I field strip, clean and lubricate my AR after every trip to the range. In this controlled environment, my AR works just fine, shoots very accurately, and rarely fails to cycle properly.

Although the AR performs well in a controlled environment, experience has shown that ARs have more trouble in harsh environments than other military rifles, particularly as compared to Kalashnikov-style weapons.

Here's the thing: there's not necessarily a trade-off between reliability and accuracy. Sure, a lot of AKs are complete junk, unlikely to hit the broad side of a barn, while ARs have a reputation for "reaching out and touching" jihadis from a considerable distance. For the same money being spent on the ARs, though, the Iraqi military could be purchasing weapons that are equal to the ARs in accuracy and equal to the Kalashnikovs in reliability. A wide variety of Kalashnikov variants have been produced over the years. The Israeli-made Galil...



...is a good example. Though a gun built by Jews would probably be off the table as an option (for political reasons,) there have been similar designs available from more "politically-acceptable" sources. The Finnish-made Valmet, for example:



Or the Russian-made VEPR:



Or the American-made Arsenal SLR:



All of these weapons rely on tried-and-true principles of firearm design and have proven track records of rock-solid reliability.

The AR-style rifles, in contrast, have been controversial from the beginning:

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara [was presented with] two conflicting views [on the AR-15]: the ARPA report favoring the AR-15 and the Pentagon's position on the M14. Even President John F. Kennedy expressed concern, so McNamara ordered Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance to test the M14, the AR-15 and the AK-47. The Army's test report stated only the M14 was suitable for Army use, but Vance wondered about the impartiality of those conducting the tests. He ordered the Army Inspector General to investigate the testing methods used, who reported that the testers showed favor to the M14.

Secretary Robert McNamara ordered a halt to M14 production in January 1964, after receiving reports that M14 production was insufficient to meet the needs of the armed forces. Secretary McNamara had long been a proponent of weapons program consolidation among the armed services. At the time, the AR-15 was the only rifle that could remotely fulfill a requirement of a 'universal' infantry weapon for issue to all services. McNamara ordered the weapon be adopted unmodified, in its current configuration, for immediate issue to all services, despite receiving reports noting several deficiencies with the M16 as a service rifle, including the lack of a chrome-lined bore and chamber, the 5.56 mm projectile's instability under Arctic conditions, and the fact that large quantities of 5.56 mm ammunition required for immediate service were not available....

When the XM16E1 reached Vietnam with U.S. troops in 1966, reports of jamming and malfunctions in combat immediately began to surface. Although the M14 had a chrome-lined barrel and chamber to resist corrosion in combat conditions (a danger learned from WWII Pacific theatre combat experience), the M16/XM16E1 had no chrome-lined bore or chamber. Several documented accounts of troops killed by enemy fire with jammed rifles broken-down for cleaning eventually brought a Congressional investigation. Later investigations also cast doubt on the veracity of the original 1962 reports of the alleged stopping effectiveness of the 5.56 mm bullet, as well as criticism of inadequate penetration (in comparison to the Soviet 7.62x39mm round) when firing at enemy personnel through light cover.

Although a rush to production plagued ARs in the early days, a mature production cycle and numerous technical enhancements over the years have never been able to overcome the built-in limitations of the AR design:

The primary criticism of direct impingement is that fouling and debris from expended gunpowder is blown directly into the breech. As the superheated combustion gas travels down the tube, it expands and cools, not unlike an aerosol can cool when depressurized. This cooling causes vaporized matter to condense as it cools depositing a much greater volume of solids into the operating components of the action. The increased fouling can cause malfunctions if the rifle is not cleaned as frequently as should be. The amount of sooting deposits tends to vary with powder specification, caliber, and gas port design. Conversely, gas-piston operation has the gases acting on a separate piston, which actuates a linkage that in turn cycles the weapon; this minimizes the amount of debris that accumulates in the breech. This sooting characteristic had not been found to be a significant hindrance to reliability with ArmaLite's earlier AR-10 in 7.62 mm caliber, which had a different gas port. Because of this sooting, the M16 rifle requires more frequent cleaning and lubrication for reliable operation compared to most gas piston rifle designs.

While the military services have never been completely happy with the M16, they have yet to develop a suitable replacement:

Replacement of the M16 family has been proposed at various points, and its longevity is in part due to a series of failures in projects meant to replace it, driven largely by the requirement for a significant improvement. Immediately after the introduction of the M16, the Marine Corps sought to adopt the Stoner 63. Although they found it superior in most ways, it was still at an early stage of development; the Marines chose the technically inferior but mature M16.